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The California Supreme Court and the
Popular Will
Kenneth P. Miller*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past half century, California has been a
battleground for conflicts over the nature, scope, and limits of
rights. While Americans have always clashed over rights, the
modern rights revolution has expanded the conflict throughout
the country, and nowhere more than in California. These
struggles have been hard fought, because rights have power.
Once an interest is converted into a right, it can trump
competing interests that lack the status of right. The ability to
recognize, create, or limit rights is consequential, indeed.1
California’s prominence in these conflicts can be traced to
several factors. First, the state has deep ideological divides.
California is home to progressive social movements that have
sought to establish new rights in areas including abortion,
capital punishment, criminal procedure, school funding, gay
rights, aid-in-dying, and more—and home, as well, to highly
motivated conservative groups that have resisted many of these
changes. Second, California exists within a federal system that
allows states to innovate in the area of rights. State
constitutional rights operate semi-independently of the U.S.
Constitution—that is, states may define state constitutional
rights more expansively than the Federal Constitution requires.
An assertive state supreme court, through state constitutional
interpretation, can establish new rights. The California Supreme
Court, more than any other state court, has expanded state
constitutional rights beyond federal minimums.2 Third, citizens
of California have extraordinary power to counter their state
supreme court, through state constitutional amendment or
* Associate Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College. The author
wishes to thank Harry Arnold, Jack Blattner, Zachariah Oquenda, and Victor Lopez for
their research assistance.
1 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PUBLIC
DISCOURSE 16 (1991); Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of
State Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 892 (2001).
2 Kenneth P. Miller, Defining Rights in the States: Judicial Activism and Popular
Response, 76 ALBANY L. REV. 2061, 2065–67 (2013).
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judicial election, when it issues decisions they oppose.
California’s court-constraining powers are particularly robust
because citizens have the ability to adopt state constitutional
amendments directly through the initiative process.3
A state with an ambitious, rights-creating court and an
energized electorate that holds competing views and wields
institutional counter-powers is poised for clashes over rights.4 In
the 1970s, such conflicts emerged in California. A progressive
majority on the California Supreme Court sought national
leadership of a movement called “the new judicial federalism”—
an effort to expand rights at the state level—but faced the
constraint of the state’s powerful system of majoritarian
democracy.5
This Article examines the efforts of the California Supreme
Court to advance the rights revolution at the state level and
the popular response to those decisions. This exchange between
the court and the people now spans more than four decades,
from the early 1970s through the relatively recent struggle over
the definition of marriage. During this period, the California
Supreme Court expanded a broad range of state constitutional
rights, many of which remain intact today. Yet, the people
countered the court when it expanded rights in ways
that conflicted with their strongly held values. These
controversies showed that, under California’s constitution, the
people, not the courts, have the last word on the state definition
of rights—so long, of course, as their decisions do not contravene
federal law.
The record indicates that Californians have exercised this
power selectively, overturning some new state-level rights, but
accepting many others. The system has imposed accountability
on the court when it strays too far from the popular will, but also
has conferred greater legitimacy on the expansion of rights above
federal minimums when the people accept what they can,
through a vote, reject.

3 On the use of court-constraining amendments in California and other states, see
generally John Dinan, Foreword: Court-Constraining Amendments and the State
Constitutional Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983 (2007).
4 See Reed, supra note 1, at 874–75.
5 For a discussion of the California Supreme Court’s early leadership of the new
judicial federalism, see Ronald K.L. Collins, Peter J. Galie & John Kincaid, State High
Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial
Survey, 13 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 599, 603 (1986); and see Robert F. Williams,
Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 211, 211–17 (2003).
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I. THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN
CALIFORNIA, 1970–1986
The movement known as the new judicial federalism
emerged in the early 1970s as progressive lawyers and judges
sought to extend the rights revolution in constitutional law
following the denouement of the Warren Court.6 The strategy
was straightforward: if Warren-era liberal justices were being
replaced by more conservative Nixon nominees and the
U.S. Supreme Court was moving to the Right, progressive state
courts needed to assume greater responsibility for the rights
revolution—that is, they needed to abandon their reliance on the
Supreme Court to expand federal constitutional rights, and
instead, start expanding rights at the state level through new,
expansive interpretations of state constitutions. In this view, for
example, as the U.S. Supreme Court chose to interpret the
warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment narrowly, in a
way that favored law enforcement, a progressive state
supreme court should chart an independent course by
interpreting its state constitution’s comparable warrant
requirements more expansively, in a way that favored criminal
defendants.7
The California Supreme Court was well positioned to pursue
this goal. Through the leadership of the legendary justice Roger
J. Traynor (1940–1970), the court had developed a reputation as
the nation’s most innovative state court, and was especially
influential in transforming American common law to align with
the values of modern liberalism.8 Working under the shadow of
the U.S. Supreme Court during the Warren era (1953–1969), the
California Supreme Court, like its progressive counterparts in
other states, had only rarely chosen to expand state
constitutional rights. But as the Warren era came to a close, it
was poised to move into that arena.

Reed, supra note 1, at 889.
See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 113–15
(2009). See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
8 See generally BEN FIELD, ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR (2003). During Traynor’s tenure,
the California Supreme Court became the nation’s most influential state court, as
measured by, among other factors, citations by other state courts. See, e.g., Gregory A.
Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83 (1983); Jake Dear
& Edward W. Jessen, “Followed Rates” and Leading State Cases, 1940-2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 683 (2007); Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton
Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1977).
6
7
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A. The Composition of the California Supreme Court, 1970–1986
In 1970, the California Supreme Court was a progressive
body consisting of six justices appointed by former two-term
Democratic Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown—Chief Justice
Traynor (Chief Justice 1964–1970) and Associate Justices
Raymond E. Peters (1959–1973), Mathew O. Tobriner
(1962−1982), Stanley Mosk (1964–2001), Louis H. Burke
(1964−1974), and Raymond L. Sullivan (1966–1977).9 The court
had one conservative holdover, Justice Marshall F. McComb
(1956–1977), but was solidly liberal overall.10
Brown’s successor as Governor, Ronald Reagan (1967–1975),
believed the court was too liberal and wanted to nominate new,
conservative justices who would exercise “judicial restraint.”11
Reagan got his first opportunity to try to redirect the court in
1970, when Chief Justice Traynor announced his retirement.
Reagan turned to an appellate judge, Donald R. Wright, to fill the
vacancy. Before his nomination, Wright was viewed as a reliable
conservative. Soon after assuming the role of chief justice,
however, Wright surprised Reagan and other conservatives by
firmly aligning with the court’s progressive majority.12 Indeed, it
was during Donald Wright’s tenure as chief justice (1970–1977),
and with his full participation, that the court began aggressively
expanding state constitutional rights. Governor Reagan’s other
two nominees, William P. Clark, Jr. (1973–1981) (later Deputy
Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, and Interior
Secretary under President Reagan) and Frank K. Richardson
(1974–1983), were solid conservatives, but generally unable to
curb the court’s progressive majority. When Democrat Edmund
G. “Jerry” Brown, Jr. succeeded Reagan in 1975, he gave the
court a new infusion of liberal justices. During his first two terms
as governor (1975–1983), Brown nominated seven progressives to
the court—Wiley W. Manuel (1977–1981), Rose Elizabeth Bird
(1977–1987), Frank C. Newman (1977–1982), Otto M. Kaus
(1981–1985), Allen E. Broussard (1981–1991), Cruz Reynoso
(1982–1987), and Joseph R. Grodin (1982–1987).13

9 Democratic Governor Culbert Olsen appointed Traynor to the court in 1940 as an
associate justice; Governor Pat Brown elevated him to Chief in 1964. California Supreme
Court Justices, CAL. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.cschs.org/history/california-supremecourt-justices/ [http://perma.cc/V6R6-QG2C].
10 Id.
11 LOU CANNON, GOVERNOR REAGAN: HIS RISE TO POWER 222–23 (2003).
12 JACQUELINE R. BRAITMAN & GERALD F. UELMEN, JUSTICE STANLEY MOSK: A LIFE
AT THE CENTER OF CALIFORNIA POLITICS AND JUSTICE 150–51 (2013).
13 California Supreme Court Justices, supra note 9.
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Only four Democrats served as Governor of California during
the twentieth century, but three of them, Culbert Olson
(1939−1943), Pat Brown (1959–1967), and Jerry Brown
(1975−1983), had an outsized influence on the court, together
nominating nineteen justices (including Traynor twice), nearly
all of whom can be described as liberal or progressive.14 These
appointments,
combined
with
Republican
governors’
inconsistency in nominating conservatives, made the California
Supreme Court one of the nation’s most liberal courts from
mid-century through 1986. In that year, as discussed further
below, voters removed three liberal justices (Bird, Reynoso, and
Grodin) through a judicial retention election, and Republican
Governor George Deukmejian replaced them with conservatives,
thereby shifting the court’s balance to the Right.15
B. The Court’s Expansion of Rights, 1970–1986
Looking back, the span from 1970 to the election of 1986
(that is, the Wright-Bird era) can be seen as the height of the
new judicial federalism in California. During those years, the
court actively expanded state constitutional rights in several
areas of law, including:
1. capital punishment
2. criminal procedure
3. equal protection (gender equality, sexual orientation
equality in employment, equality in public school
financing, desegregation of public schools, and racial
non-discrimination in jury selection)
4. abortion (basic right to abortion and right to publicly
funded abortion)
5. free speech (expansion of free speech and petition rights
on private property)
6. non-establishment of religion
Table 1 sets forth these new state constitutional rights, and
the court decisions establishing them, in more detail.

14 Olson nominated three justices, Pat Brown nine, and Jerry Brown seven (during
his first two terms from 1975–1983). These figures separately count both nominations of
Traynor.
15 See infra Section III.D.
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Table 1: New Court-Established California State
Constitutional Rights, 1970–1986
Category

New State
Constitutional Rights

Criminal Justice
(capital
punishment)

Right against execution /
abolition of capital
punishment

People v. Anderson (1972)16

Criminal Justice
(procedure)

Procedural rights of
criminal defendants,
including those related
to admissions,
confessions, searches,
exclusionary rule,17
vicarious exclusionary
rule18

People v. Krivda (1971)19 (searches);
Mozetti v. Superior Court (1971)20
(searches); People v. Superior Court
(Hawkins) (1972)21 (blood tests);
Burrows v. Superior Court (1974)22
(warrants); People v. Longwill
(1975)23 (searches); People v.
Brisendine (1975)24 (searches);
People v. Disbrow (1976)25
(admissions); People v. Jimenez
(1978)26 (confessions); People v.
Pettingill (1978)27 (interrogations);
In re Tony C. (1978)28 (stop and
frisk); People v. Wheeler (1978)29
(jury selection)

Criminal Justice
(procedure)

Procedural rights of
criminal defendants,
including those related
to reciprocal discovery;
hearsay at preliminary
hearing; post-indictment
preliminary hearing

Reynolds v. Superior Court (1974)
(restrictions on prosecutorial
discovery);30 Allen v. Superior Court
(1976) (restrictions on prosecutorial
discovery);31 In re Misener (1985)32
(restrictions on prosecutorial
discovery); Mills v. Superior Court
(1986)33 (confrontation of accusers

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Cases Establishing Rights

People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
People v. Martin, 85 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1955).
People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971).
Mozetti v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1971).
People v. Superior Court, 493 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1972).
Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974).
People v. Longwill, 538 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1975).
People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099 (Cal. 1975).
People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1976).
People v. Jimenez, 580 P.2d 672 (Cal. 1978).
People v. Pettingill, 578 P.2d 108 (Cal. 1978).
In re Tony C., 582 P.2d 957 (Cal. 1978).
People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
Reynolds v. Superior Court, 528 P.2d 45 (Cal. 1974).
Allen v. Superior Court, 557 P.2d 65 (1976).
In re Misener, 698 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1985).
Mills v. Superior Court, 728 P.2d 211 (Cal. 1986).
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Cases Establishing Rights
at preliminary hearing); Hawkins v.
Superior Court (1978)34 (right to
post-indictment preliminary
hearing)

Equal Protection
(gender)

Strict scrutiny for laws
that classify on basis of
gender

Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971)35

Equal Protection
(race)

Right to desegregation of
public schools regardless
of cause of segregation

Crawford v. Board of Education of
Los Angeles (1976),36 re-affirming
dictum in Jackson v. Pasadena City
School District (1963)37

Equal Protection
(sexual
orientation)

Right to nondiscrimination based on
sexual orientation in
employment

Gay Law Students Association v.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.
(1979)38

Equal Protection
(education)

Right to equalized public
school funding

Serrano v. Priest II (1976)39

Abortion

Right to abortion

People v. Belous (1969);40
People v. Barksdale (1972)41

Abortion

Right to publicly funded
abortion

Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers (1981)42

Free speech

Right to free speech on
private property

Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center (1979)43

Religion
Prohibition on religious
(non-establishment) displays on public
property

Fox v. City of Los Angeles (1978)44

Religion
Prohibition on state(non-establishment) loaned textbooks to
parochial schools

California Teachers Association v.
Riles (1981)45

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1978).
Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971).
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963).
Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
Serrano v. Priest II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969).
People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1972).
Comm. to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979).
Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978).
California Teachers Ass’n v. Riles, 632 P. 2d 953 (Cal. 1981).
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C. The Court’s Primary Focus: Criminal Justice
As Table 1 indicates, during this period the California
Supreme Court expanded state constitutional rights most
actively in the area of criminal justice. This ordering is logical,
considering that a large share of a state supreme court’s
constitutional jurisprudence arises in criminal cases, and because
the Burger Court was retreating from the Warren Court’s
expansive interpretation of the rights of criminal defendants.46
At the urging of Justice Stanley Mosk, the California Supreme
Court made the deliberate choice to distance itself from U.S.
Supreme Court’s definitions of the rights of defendants and start
charting its own, independent, more progressive course.47
1. Capital Punishment
Perhaps the most influential case in establishing the new
judicial federalism was People v. Anderson (1972),48 a state
constitutional challenge to California’s death penalty. As state
constitutional law scholar Robert F. Williams has noted, the
California Supreme Court’s decision in the case stimulated “the
initial recognition that state courts could evade decisions of the
United States Supreme Court by relying on their own state
constitutions.”49 At the time, the U.S. Supreme Court had
granted review in Furman v. Georgia (1972)50 on the question of
whether capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment.
The California Supreme Court’s progressive majority distrusted
the Burger Court on this question and accelerated proceedings in
People v. Anderson.51 Before the U.S. Supreme Court could issue
its decision in Furman, the California Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Wright, held that capital punishment
violated the California Constitution’s prohibition on cruel or
unusual punishments. By basing the Anderson ruling on
independent state grounds rather than on the Federal
Constitution, the court showed other state supreme courts how to
establish new rights in a way that insulated the decision from
federal court review.52

46 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 125
(2009). Williams notes: “The field of criminal procedure has, in many ways, provided the
driving force behind the NJF. It is in this area that state courts first realized they could
reach results different from those reached by the U.S. Supreme Court, or at least consider
doing so.” Id.; see also G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 178 (1998).
47 BRAITMAN & UELMEN, supra note 12, at 152–54.
48 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
49 Williams, supra note 5, at 213.
50 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
51 RONALD M. GEORGE, CHIEF: THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 76–77 (2013).
52 WILLIAMS, supra note 46, at 120; see also Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the
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2. Criminal Procedure
From 1970 forward, the California Supreme Court’s criminal
procedure rulings formed an expansive web of state-level
protections greater than those offered by the Federal
Constitution’s Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. This outpouring of new
state constitutional rights related to admissions, confessions,
searches, “stop-and-frisk,” jury selection, and other elements of
criminal procedure shifted the balance of state constitutional
interpretation in California markedly in favor of defendants at a
time when the U.S. Supreme Court was shifting the federal
constitutional balance in favor of police and prosecutors.53
D. Other Decisions: Advancing the Progressive Agenda of the
1970s and 1980s
Beyond criminal justice, the California Supreme Court’s
rights-expanding decisions during this era spanned a range of
topics. The rulings corresponded with the progressive agenda of
the 1970s and 1980s in areas including: racial, gender, and
sexual orientation equality; abortion rights; equalization of
education; free speech; and secularization of the public square.
Each case, by definition, involved the discovery of a gap between
the rights provisions of California Constitution and the
U.S. Constitution, as interpreted, respectively, by the state and
federal supreme courts.54
1. Racial Equality
In the 1970s and 1980s, equal protection jurisprudence
related to race became increasingly complex as the U.S. Supreme
Court wrestled with the scope of remedies for racial inequality.
During this period, the California Supreme Court expanded state
constitutional rights beyond federal minimums in a highly
controversial area: desegregation of public schools.
In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court placed limits on
court-ordered busing to achieve desegregation. Perhaps most
importantly, the Court held in Milliken v. Bradley (1974) that if
school districts had not imposed de jure segregation, that is, had
not intentionally segregated students on the basis of race, the

Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972).
53 For an overview of the expansion of state constitutional rights of criminal
defendants during this era, see generally BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1991).
54 Joseph R. Grodin, Liberty and Equality Under the California Constitution, 7 CAL.
LEGAL HIST. 167, passim (2012).
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Equal Protection Clause generally did not require such remedial
measures.55 Several districts in California, including Los Angeles
Unified School District, had significant racial imbalances
between schools, but it was a contested question whether school
officials had intentionally segregated schools on the basis of
race.56 The California Supreme Court was unwilling to accept the
limitations of the Milliken standard, and in Crawford v. Board of
Education of Los Angeles (1976),57 the court invoked the state
constitution’s
equal
protection
guarantee
to
require
desegregation regardless of the reasons for racial imbalances.58
The decision paved the way for court-ordered busing in Los
Angeles and elsewhere in the state.59
The court again expanded equality principles beyond federal
minimums when it held in People v. Wheeler (1978) that, during
jury selection in criminal trials, attorneys could not “[use]
preemptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole
ground of group bias.”60 The preemptory challenge historically
allows attorneys to excuse potential witnesses without any
explanation, but could be abused to exclude potential jurors
based solely on their race, ethnicity, religion, or other group

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
A 1970 L.A. Superior Court decision found that the L.A. Unified School District
had established de jure segregation, but, later, the state court of appeals reversed,
concluding that there was insufficient evidence for such a finding. See Crawford v. Bd. of
Educ. of L.A., 170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Ct. App. 1981).
57 Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
58 Syliva Yau, School Board’s Affirmative Duty to Alleviate Segregation Regardless of
Race, 65 CAL. L. REV. 319–29 (1977).
59 During this period, the California Supreme Court departed from progressive
ideology on race in one important case, Bakke v. Regents of University of California, 553
P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976). This famous case involved a constitutional challenge to the
admissions policies at the University of California at Davis medical school. Under those
policies, the medical school set aside 16 of its 100 seats each year for a separate “special
admissions program” that admitted only racial minorities. In a decision authored by
Justice Mosk, the court held that this quota program violated the Federal Constitution.
Many on the left attacked the court, and especially, Justice Mosk, for the decision. Mosk
decided to base the Bakke decision not on the California Constitution, but rather on the
Federal Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. As a consequence, the constitutional
limitation on affirmative action was subject to U.S. Supreme Court review. The high court
granted certiorari in the case and agreed with the California Supreme Court’s judgment
that the U.C. Davis medical school’s admissions quota system violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. In a letter to Hans Linde, Mosk noted: “I calculatingly relied on federal
constitutional grounds for my Bakke opinion. Some of us are hopeful the United States
Supreme Court will grapple with the issue so improvidently avoided in De Funis. Had I
employed state constitutional provisions, our brethren in Washington would have had
good reason to avoid certiorari. They now must consider the inevitable certiorari
application on its merits. This is a rare exception to our normal desire to hasten finality of
litigation.” BRAITMAN & UELMEN, supra note 12, at 172.
60 People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). The court based its ruling on
California Constitution article I, section 16, which guarantees the right to a trial by a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.
55
56
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characteristics. In the absence of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling
addressing the problem, the California Supreme Court acted,
establishing the right to challenge such bias in the jury selection
process. Nearly a decade later, in Batson v. Kentucky (1986),61 the
U.S. Supreme Court established a federal constitutional
protection against this type of bias in jury selection, following the
principles the California Supreme Court established in Wheeler.62
2. Gender Equality
The birth of the new judicial federalism corresponded with
the rise of second wave feminism, an era of heightened activism
in support of gender equality. Proponents of women’s rights used
both political activism and legal mobilization to advance their
goals. As proponents of a Federal Equal Rights Amendment
struggled to win ratification, litigants attempted to persuade the
U.S. Supreme Court to employ the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause to strike down laws that made
distinctions on the basis of gender. The Court moved in that
direction, but with some ambivalence. In Reed v. Reed (1971),63
the Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down a
law that discriminated against women in the administration of
estates, but did so using rational basis analysis rather than
heightened judicial scrutiny. Two years later, in Frontiero
v. Richardson (1973),64 the Court struck down gender distinctions
in benefits to military personnel, but fell one vote short of
declaring gender a suspect classification subject to strict judicial
scrutiny. Finally, in Craig v. Boren (1976),65 a case invalidating
gender distinctions in the state’s drinking age, the Court decided
to treat gender as a “semi-suspect” classification, subject to
intermediate judicial scrutiny. The California Supreme Court
moved further and faster. In 1971, in Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,66
the court invalidated a state law banning women from serving as
bartenders. The court declared that gender classifications should
be treated as suspect and should be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny—that is, gender should be treated like race.67 The court
based its Sail’er Inn decision on the equal protection provisions of
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
The U.S. Supreme Court based its Batson ruling on the Federal Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 89.
63 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
64 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
65 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
66 Sail’er Inn v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971).
67 Through Sail’er Inn, the California Supreme Court became the nation’s first state
supreme court to treat gender as a suspect classification. John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles
L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV.
675, 690–91 (1971).
61
62

Do Not Delete

162

3/5/2016 11:59 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 19:1

both the federal and state constitutions. When the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the strict scrutiny rule for gender classifications in
Reed v. Reed, the Sail’er Inn doctrine remained a state
constitutional principle—again demonstrating how state
supreme courts can establish rights beyond federal constitutional
minimums.
3. Sexual Orientation Equality
During this period, the gay rights movement was also
gaining strength in California and in other parts of the country.
Among other goals, the movement sought to protect gay and
lesbian persons as a class from discrimination based on sexual
orientation, in the workplace and elsewhere. Well before the
U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Romer v. Evans
(1996),68 interpreting the Federal Equal Protection Clause to
protect gay and lesbian persons, the California Supreme Court
established this principle under the California Constitution. In
Gay Law Students v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. (1979),
the court held that the equal protection provisions of California
Constitution article I, section 7(a) prohibit public employers
(in this case, a publicly regulated private utility company) from
discriminating against persons based on their sexual
orientation.69 Through this decision, the California Supreme
Court again advanced the rights revolution into an area where
other courts would later follow.
4. Abortion
Meanwhile, the movement for personal autonomy in matters
of procreation generated another contested question of
constitutional rights—that is, whether a woman has a
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy. In 1973, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued its sweeping decision in Roe v. Wade,70 but
again it was trailing the California Supreme Court. In People
v. Belous (1969),71 the California Supreme Court invalidated a
statute that criminalized abortion except when “necessary to
preserve the life” of the pregnant woman, on the grounds that the
law was unconstitutionally vague—the nation’s first judicial
decision declaring an abortion statute unconstitutional.72 In
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969).
See id. at 203–08 (overturning the conviction of a physician prosecuted under the
statute); see also S.B. 462, 1967–1968 Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1967) (before the Court
issued its decision in Belous, the California Legislature adopted the Therapeutic Abortion
Act of 1967, a statute that liberalized abortion policy in the state).
68
69
70
71
72
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People v. Barksdale (1972),73 the California Supreme Court
struck down under both the California and Federal Constitutions
the next iteration of the state’s abortion law, which had allowed
abortion only in cases where “there is a substantial risk that
continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical
or mental health of the mother,” or in cases of rape or incest—
again on the grounds that this criminal statute was
unconstitutionally vague.74 The California Supreme Court’s
constitutional analysis of abortion restrictions influenced courts
in other states, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe.75
In the post-Roe era, the California Supreme Court expanded
abortion rights beyond where the U.S. Supreme Court was
prepared to go. For example, when the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected a federal constitutional right to federally funded
abortion in Harris v. McRae (1980),76 the California Supreme
Court, in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers
(1981),77 established a state constitutional right to state-funded
abortion. And, as further discussed below, after the Supreme
Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey (1992)78 allowed states to impose certain restrictions on
abortion rights, including parental consent rules, the California
Supreme Court determined that California’s parental consent
rule violated the state constitution.79
5. Educational Equality
In the 1970s, a gap emerged between the California Supreme
Court and the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether
there is a constitutional right to equalized funding of public
education. In Serrano v. Priest I (1971),80 the California Supreme
Court held that the state’s school funding policies involved both a
suspect classification—because tying school funding to the
property values in a local school district created a classification
based on wealth—and a fundamental interest, education. Based

People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257, 267 (Cal. 1972).
Id. at 260.
Arthur G. Scotland, The Landmark Abortion Decisions: Justifiable Termination or
Miscarriage of Justice?—Proposals for Legislative Response, 4 PAC. L.J. 821, 823–27 (1973).
76 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309–16 (1980).
77 Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 806 (Cal. 1981).
78 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992).
79 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 818–19 (Cal. 1997). California’s
parental consent law was enacted in 1987 through Assembly Bill 2274, which became
1987 Cal. Stat. 1237 (amending California Civil Code section 34.5 and adding California
Health and Safety Code section 25958). The law was challenged immediately after its
adoption and its enforcement was stayed pending the outcome of the litigation. It was
never enforced.
80 Serrano v. Priest I, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 1264–65 (Cal. 1971).
73
74
75
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on these determinations, the court applied strict scrutiny to
state’s system for school funding and invalidated the system.81
When the U.S. Supreme Court addressed these same issues in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973),82
however, it reached the opposite result, rejecting the view that
wealth is a suspect classification and that education is a
protected right under the Federal Constitution. The California
Supreme Court was unwilling to accept that outcome. In Serrano
v. Priest II (1976),83 the court invoked the state constitution
alone, requiring equalization of public school funding.
6. Free Speech
In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979),84 the
California Supreme Court expanded the constitutional protection
of free speech to include speech and political solicitation activities
in shopping centers, even when the property is privately owned.
The decision expanded California’s free speech rights beyond
federal constitutional standards, which protect speech against
abridgement by government actors, not private entities. When
the mall challenged the ruling in the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Court narrowly affirmed in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins
(1980), noting that California has the “right to adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those
conferred by the Federal Constitution.”85 This is true so long as
the state court’s ruling did not violate any provision of the
Federal Constitution. Here, the Court held that the California
rule requiring a private shopping mall to protect free speech on
its property did not rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking.
The California Supreme Court’s Pruneyard decision remains an
anomaly in state constitutional jurisprudence, almost universally
rejected by other states.86 Nevertheless, it again highlights how a
state supreme court can establish new constitutional rights when
the right is rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.

81 See id.; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court’s
Responsibilities and Opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60
CAL. L. REV. 720 (1972) (explaining that the California Supreme Court was the nation’s
first court to declare that a state’s education funding system violated the state and federal
constitutions); Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, Disorder in the Courts: The
Aftermath of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez in the State Courts, 30
VAL. U. L. REV. 551, 558 (1996).
82 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973).
83 See Serrano v. Priest II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
84 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 343 (Cal. 1979). For an analysis
of the Pruneyard litigation, see Joseph R. Grodin, Freedom of Expression Under the
California Constitution, 6 CAL. LEGAL HIST. 187, 198–207 (2011).
85 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
86 Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1145, 1151–52 (2007).
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7. Non-establishment of Religion
In its Establishment Clause cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
has allowed, under some conditions, limited government
accommodation and even support of religion, including the
display of religious objects on public property87 or the provision of
textbooks or transportation to students in religious schools.88 The
California Supreme Court has interpreted the California
Constitution to require a stricter separation. Two examples are
Fox v. City of Los Angeles (1978),89 which prohibited religious
displays on public property, and California Teachers Association
v. Riles (1981),90 which prohibited loans of state textbooks to
religious organizations.
Through these and other cases, the California Supreme
Court of the Wright-Bird era established a clear pattern of
advancing a more progressive constitutional order in California.
Some California Supreme Court decisions from this era helped
catalyze the recognition of rights by the U.S. Supreme Court (for
example, in Roe v. Wade91 and Batson v. Kentucky92) and other
state supreme courts. But the Court’s innovations also invited
controversy at home.
II. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE WRIGHT-BIRD ERA
The California Supreme Court does not operate in a vacuum,
but, rather, in a complex checks-and-balances political system in
which the people may override its decisions through
constitutional amendment, and may remove justices from the
court through retention elections or recall. In the period
1970−1986, the California Supreme Court was a highly
ambitious, progressive court operating in a state that had strong
progressive elements, but also a broad and deep conservative
streak. Accordingly, the court was vulnerable to popular
opposition. During these years, the California electorate was
ideologically more conservative than it is today and stood clearly
to the right of the court on a number of issues. On several
occasions, the court’s opponents were able to mobilize these more
conservative elements of the electorate and use various
87 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 714 (1984) (allowing the presentation of
the nativity scene as part of an annual Christmas display by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island).
88 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 252 (1968) (upholding a New York
law providing for the lending of textbooks to students in private—including religious—
schools).
89 Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663, 682 (Cal. 1978).
90 Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953, 963 (Cal. 1981).
91 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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democratic means to overturn and otherwise limit the court’s
progressive agenda.
A. The Electorate
Although California is now one of the most liberal and solidly
Democratic states in the nation, it has not always been so. In the
early 1970s, as the California Supreme Court was launching the
new judicial federalism, the California electorate was more
conservative than it is today. In the late 1960s, in the wake of
social unrest in the state, rising crime, and other factors,
pollsters reported an increase in the percentage of California
voters who identified as politically conservative.93 As late as the
1990s, California remained a highly competitive battleground
state in partisan elections as progressive and conservative
ideologies vied for dominance. Voters roughly supported
Democratic and Republican candidates equally , and often split
tickets. Democrats generally controlled the Legislature, while
Republicans more often won top-of-the-ticket races for Governor,
U.S. Senator, and President of the United States.94 For example,
between 1966 and 1998, Republicans won six gubernatorial
elections—Ronald Reagan (1966, 1970); George Deukmejian
(1982, 1986); and Pete Wilson (1990, 1994)—a string interrupted
only by Democrat Jerry Brown’s two victories in 1974 and 1978.
Even more remarkably, in the six presidential elections between
1968 and 1988, California voters supported the Republican
candidate for President each time—Richard Nixon (1968, 1972);
Gerald Ford (1976); Ronald Reagan (1980, 1984); and George
H.W. Bush (1988). Democrats were not able to break Republican
dominance in securing California’s presidential electors until
1992.95 This relatively conservative electorate was not
necessarily inclined to embrace the state supreme court’s
progressive agenda.
B. Mobilization
Before the 1970s, voters had never overturned a rights
decision of the California Supreme Court through constitutional

93 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL RELEASE #647: DRAMATIC UPSWING IN
PROPORTION OF VOTERS WHO SEE THEMSELVES AS POLITICALLY CONSERVATIVE (Sept. 16,
1969); MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL RELEASE #703: PART I: SELF-STYLED
CONSERVATISM THE DOMINANT MOOD OF CALIFORNIA ELECTORATE TODAY (Jan. 19, 1971).
94 See, e.g., MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL RELEASE #1420: STATE EVENLY
DIVIDED BETWEEN DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS (Feb. 1, 1988).
95 For a discussion of political change in California during this period, see Morris P.
Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, Is California Really a Blue State?, in THE NEW POLITICAL
GEOGRAPHY OF CALIFORNIA 291–308 (Frédérick Douzet, Thad Kousser & Kenneth P.
Miller eds., 2008).
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amendment, nor come close to defeating justices through
retention elections.96 Although the court had issued various
controversial decisions during the Traynor era and before,
opponents had never successfully persuaded the public to push
back. In the 1970s, however, conservative elected officials (mostly
Republicans, but also some Democrats), interest groups, and the
Republican Party organization made a counter-discovery to the
court’s experimentation with the new judicial federalism. Just as
progressive justices were exploring the possibilities of expanding
rights through new interpretations of the state constitution,
opponents realized they could mobilize the state’s electorate to
counter the court, at least on some issues.
C. Institutional Options
The court’s critics had several ways to challenge its decisions
and institutional power—legislative constitutional amendment,
initiative constitutional amendment, and removal of justices,
either by judicial retention election or recall.
1. Legislative Constitutional Amendment
The most common form of state constitutional amendment is
the legislative constitutional amendment, or LCA. Under the
LCA process, the legislature proposes an amendment and refers
it to the people for ratification or rejection (the one exception is
Delaware, which allows the Legislature to amend the state
constitution without voter approval).97 Different states have
different threshold requirements for legislative and popular
approval of amendments. California requires a two-thirds vote of
both houses of the Legislature to propose the amendment, and a
simple majority popular vote for ratification.98 To succeed under
these rules, a legislative amendment must enjoy broad support—
that is, a supermajority of the Legislature as well as concurrence
by the electorate.
2. Initiative Constitutional Amendment
California is one of sixteen states (the others are Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri,
96 See JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 105 (1989). In 1968, critics of Chief Justice Traynor stirred
some opposition to his retention, but the effort failed. Traynor had authored the court’s
controversial decision in Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966), striking down
Proposition 14 of 1964. That measure had restricted the state’s ability to enact fair
housing legislation. Despite this controversy, Traynor won retention with 65% of the vote. Id.
97 John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2013, in 46 THE BOOK OF THE
STATES 2014, at 12−13 tbl.1.2 (2014) [hereinafter THE BOOK OF THE STATES].
98 CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 4.
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Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and South Dakota) where citizens may invoke the
initiative process to amend their state constitution directly,
without involvement by the Legislature.99 As noted above,
California has the nation’s most robust system for
citizen-initiated constitutional amendment (ICA). The California
initiative process gives citizens power to amend the constitution
with little restraint. The main limitations on citizen-initiated
amendments are that they must address only one subject and
may only amend, rather than revise, the constitution.100 To
qualify an amendment for the ballot, proponents must gather
signatures equaling 8% of the vote in the last gubernatorial
election (compared to only 5% for initiative statutes) in a 150-day
period. Once the amendment qualifies for the ballot, it can be
adopted by a simple majority vote on the question—without any
involvement or limitation by the Legislature or the Governor.
Between 1970 and 2015, Californians adopted twenty-nine
initiative constitutional amendments, the most of any state
during that period.101 As discussed below, several of the approved
amendments reversed decisions by the California Supreme Court.
3. Judicial Election
California’s system for selection and retention of supreme
court justices is unique among the states. As set forth in article
VI of the California Constitution, the process gives the Governor
broad discretion in nominating justices to fill vacancies on the
court (that is, unlike the so-called “merit selection” system used
in some states, the Governor is not limited to a pool of candidates
selected by a commission); it then places two separate checks on
the Governor’s choice.102 The first check is a confirmation vote by
the three-member Commission on Judicial Appointments,
consisting of the chief justice of the California Supreme Court,
the senior presiding justice of the state’s courts of appeal, and the
99 THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 97, at 14. In two additional states,
Massachusetts and Mississippi, citizens can initiate constitutional amendments, but must
first submit them to the Legislature, and, in Massachusetts, the Legislature has the
power to block the initiative’s enactment. Id.
100 CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. For a discussion of the distinctions between
constitutional revision and amendment in California, see Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.2d 48
(Cal. 2009), and Eugene C. Lee, The Revision of California’s Constitution, California
Policy Seminar Brief 1991 (on file with author).
101 Map of Initiatives Passed in the USA as of 2013, MILLER-ROSE INITIATIVE
DATABASE, http://initiatives.roseinstitute.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2016); see also California
Ballot Measures, U.C. HASTINGS C.L., http://library.uchastings.edu/research/ballots/ (last
visited Feb. 7, 2016); Initiatives by Title and Summary Year, CAL. SECRETARY ST. ALEX
PADILLA, http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ballot-measures/pdf/initiatives-by-title-and-sum
mary-year.pdf [http://perma.cc/QD6Q-96RZ ].
102 THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 97, at 241–42.
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Attorney General. If confirmed by this body, the new justice
takes a seat on the court and serves until the next gubernatorial
election. At that point, the public exercises the second check, by
deciding whether to confirm the new justice or remove her from
the court. In this vote, only the name of the justice—no
opponents—appear on the ballot and the voters cast a “yes” or
“no” vote on the question of whether to retain that justice for the
balance of the term. The court’s seven seats have staggered
twelve-year terms. When a new justice fills a vacancy, she may
serve the unexpired years remaining in the term. For example, if
a vacancy occurs in the sixth year of a term, the new justice may
serve for the remaining six years. At the expiration of the term, a
justice seeking to remain on the court must face the voters again
in a retention election. The election is again an up-or-down vote
and the justice faces no competing candidates. Instead, the voters
decide whether to retain the justice or remove the justice and
create a new vacancy to be filled through the normal process of
nomination by the Governor and confirmation by the commission
and voters. If retained, the justice is authorized to serve an
additional twelve years.103
4. Judicial Recall
The California Constitution allows citizens to circulate
petitions demanding the recall of public officials, including
judges, prior to the expiration of their normal terms.104 To force a
recall election, proponents must obtain within 160 days
signatures equaling 12% of the vote for the office in the last
election.105 Citizens have never qualified a recall petition against
a member of the California Supreme Court, but the device
provides an additional popular check on the court.106 Through
judicial election and recall, the people have periodic opportunities
to remove justices who stray too far from the public will.
III. POPULAR PUSH-BACK AGAINST THE WRIGHT AND BIRD COURTS
The combination of several elements—an activist, progressive
court; an electorate that was more conservative than the court on
some issues; political actors who could mobilize voters to
challenge the court and institutional tools that allowed the
people to do so—defined the relationship between the court and
CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 16.
Id. art. II; CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 11001, 11006 (West 2015).
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b); ELEC. § 11221(c).
Recall petitions have been circulated against several members of the court, but
none have qualified for the ballot. See Complete List of Recall Attempts, CAL. SECRETARY
ST. ALEX PADILLA, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/recalls/complete-list-recall-attempts/
[http://perma.cc/FXD2-R2RC].
103
104
105
106
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the people throughout the Wright-Bird era. Table 2 summarizes
some of that conflict, listing, by category, leading cases
establishing new rights and state constitutional amendments
designed to override some of those decisions.
Table 2: New Court-Established California State Constitutional Rights,
1970–1986, and Overriding Amendments
Category
Criminal
Justice
(capital
punishment)
Criminal
Justice
(procedure)

Criminal
Justice
(procedure)

New State
Constitutional
Rights
Right against
execution /
abolition of
capital
punishment
Procedural
rights of
criminal
defendants,
including those
related to
admissions,
confessions,
searches,
exclusionary
rule,108
vicarious
exclusionary
rule109
Procedural
rights of
criminal
defendants,
those related to
reciprocal
discovery;
hearsay at
preliminary
hearing; postindictment
preliminary
hearing

Cases
Establishing
Rights
People v. Anderson
(1972)

People v. Krivda
(1971) (searches);
People v. Superior
Court (Hawkins)
(1972) (blood tests);
People v. Longwill
(1975) (searches);
People v. Brisendine
(1975) (searches);
People v. Disbrow
(1976) (admissions);
People v. Jimenez
(1978) (confessions);
People v. Pettingill
(1978)
(interrogations)
Reynolds v.
Superior Court
(1974) (restrictions
on prosecutorial
discovery); Allen v.
Superior Court
(1976) (restrictions
on prosecutorial
discovery); In re
Misener (1985)
(restrictions on
prosecutorial
discovery); Mills v.
Superior Court
(confrontation of
accusers at
preliminary
hearing); Hawkins

Overriding
Amendments

Vote

Prop. 17
(1972)

Pass
(67.5%)107

Prop. 8
(1982)

Pass
(56.4%)110

Prop. 115
(1990)

Pass
(57.03%)111

107 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL
ELECTION NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 30 (1972).
108 People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
109 People v. Martin, 85 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1955).
110 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, STATEMENT OF VOTE: PRIMARY ELECTION
JUNE 8, 1982, at 45 (1982).
111 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, STATEMENT OF VOTE: JUNE 5, 1990, at 51
(1990).
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New State
Constitutional
Rights

Strict scrutiny
for laws that
classify on basis
of gender
Right to
desegregation of
public schools
regardless of
cause of
segregation
Right against
racial
discrimination
in jury selection
(peremptory
challenges)
Right to nondiscrimination
based on sexual
orientation in
employment
Right to
equalized public
school funding
Right to
abortion

Abortion

Right to
publicly funded
abortion

Free speech

Right to free
speech on
private property

Religion
Prohibition on
(nonreligious
establishment) displays on
public property
Religion
Prohibition on
(nonstate-loaned
establishment) textbooks to
parochial
schools

Cases
Establishing
Rights
v. Superior Court
(1978) (right to
post-indictment
preliminary
hearing)
Sail’er Inn, Inc. v.
Kirby (1971)

Overriding
Amendments

171
Vote

No

—

Crawford v. Board
of Education of Los
Angeles (1976)

Prop. 1
(1979)
(LCA)

Pass
(68.6%)112

People v. Wheeler
(1978)

No

—

Gay Law Students
Association v.
Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co.
(1979)
Serrano v. Priest II
(1976)

No

—

No

—

People v. Belous
(1969);
People v. Barksdale
(1972)
Committee to
Defend
Reproductive Rights
v. Myers (1981)
Robins v.
Pruneyard
Shopping Center
(1979)
Fox v. City of Los
Angeles (1978)

No

—

No

—

No

—

No

—

California Teachers
Association v. Riles
(1981)

No

—

112 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, STATEMENT OF VOTE: SPECIAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 6, 1979 (1979).
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A. Crime
The biggest divide between the court and the people of
California during the Wright-Bird era was in the area of criminal
justice—in particular, capital punishment and criminal
procedure. As the court focused on expanding the rights of
criminal defendants, the public was much more concerned with
controlling crime and protecting the rights of crime victims.
Polling data from the era demonstrates the public’s intense
concern about crime policy and its frustration with the court’s
perceived leniency.
1. Capital Punishment
At the end of the 1960s, some legal scholars, activists,
lawyers, and judges started developing the theory that capital
punishment was per se cruel and unusual punishment, and
therefore, could be abolished by courts.113 Before that time, the
issue was considered a political question for the people and their
representatives to decide. Pollsters regularly surveyed public
attitudes on capital punishment. In California, a significant
minority of voters favored “doing away with” the death penalty,
but was consistently outnumbered by those who wanted to
preserve the ultimate sanction. In the fifteen years leading up to
People v. Anderson (1972),114 the Field Poll surveyed the question
seven times. Table 3 summarizes those results, as well as the
results of a survey taken after the Anderson decision.
Table 3: Public Opinion on Capital Punishment in
California, 1956–1972115
Year

Keep Capital Punishment

Do Away With It

No Opinion

1956

49 %

29 %

22 %

1960

55 %

35 %

10 %

1963

56 %

28 %

16 %

1965

51 %

39 %

10 %

1966

54 %

30 %

16 %

1969

65 %

26 %

9%

1971

58 %

34 %

8%

Feb. 1972
Sept. 1972

People v. Anderson
66 %

24 %

10 %

113 An influential article advocating judicial invalidation of capital punishment was
Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970).
114 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
115 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #726: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
THE DEATH PENALTY REMAINS AT A RELATIVELY HIGH LEVEL (Sept. 14, 1971) [hereinafter
RELEASE #726]; MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #761: OVERWHELMING
SUPPORT FOR DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA (Sept. 7, 1972) [hereinafter RELEASE #761].
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In reporting the results of the 1971 poll, Field noted that
“[s]ome legislators have suggested that this issue be presented to
voters on the 1972 ballot, but if a public vote were being held
now, there is little question that a substantial majority of
California voters would favor keeping the death penalty.”116
When in February 1972 the California Supreme Court issued
its decision in Anderson declaring that capital punishment per se
violated the California Constitution, it was effectively testing
that assumption. The state’s system of initiative constitutional
amendment made it comparatively easy for opponents of the
decision to put the question to voters: should the state
constitution be amended to overturn Anderson? Law enforcement
groups (including district attorneys, police, and sheriffs) and
then-State Senator George Deukmejian mobilized and quickly
qualified an initiative constitutional amendment for the
November 1972 ballot. The amendment stated that the death
penalty provided for under state statutes “shall not be deemed
to be, or to constitute, infliction of cruel or unusual
punishments . . . nor shall such punishment for such offenses be
deemed to contravene any other provision of this constitution.”117
A survey taken in September 1972, during the early stages of the
public debate on the amendment, indicated that public support
for capital punishment had increased after the court’s decision in
Anderson, from 58% in September 1971 to 66% in September
1972, rising to the highest level recorded by the Field Poll since it
began surveying the issue in 1956.118 On Election Day, voters
approved the amendment by a decisive 67.5–32.5% margin, thus
overriding the court and restoring the validity of capital
punishment under the California Constitution.119
2. Criminal Procedure
The California Supreme Court’s early advancement of the
new judicial federalism featured many decisions expanding
procedural rights of criminal defendants. The court’s agenda
aligned with progressive ideas about reforming the criminal
justice system, but conflicted with the broader public’s concerns
about crime and public safety. Polling data again exposed this
gap. In a 1973 poll, respondents listed crime and fear of crime as

RELEASE #726, supra note 115, at 2.
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
C ONSTITUTION ,
P ROPOSITIONS
AND
P ROPOSED
L AWS
T OGETHER
WITH
ARGUMENTS: GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 42 (1972).
118 RELEASE #761, supra note 115; see also MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL,
RELEASE #766: RESTORATION OF DEATH PENALTY FAVORED BY VOTERS (Oct. 24, 1972).
119 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., supra note 107, at 30.
116
117
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the most important problem facing the state, and one respondent
in three claimed to have been a victim of crime in the past
year.120 Deep concern about crime persisted from the 1970s
through the mid-1990s. In a 1984 survey, for example,
respondents ranked crime as their greatest concern—with 73%
“extremely concerned” and an additional 23% “somewhat
concerned.”121
In light of these sentiments, the public became increasingly
frustrated by the court’s focus on restricting the powers of law
enforcement and expanding the state constitutional rights of
criminal defendants. The law enforcement community saw an
opportunity. It organized an effort to qualify an initiative
constitutional amendment that would, in one stroke, overturn
existing, pro-defense rulings and constrain future decisions of
this type. In 1982, this coalition qualified for the ballot a
combined initiative constitutional amendment and initiative
statute called the Victims’ Bill of Rights. The measure, which
appeared on the ballot as Proposition 8 of 1982, made sweeping
changes to the state’s criminal justice system to limit the state
constitutional rights of criminal defendants, increase the rights
of crime victims, and enhance the powers of police and
prosecutors. It embedded in the state constitution the right to
restitution, restrictions on bail, limitations on plea bargaining,
the right of crime victims to be heard at sentencing, enhanced
punishment for recidivist offenders, restrictions on sentencing to
the Youth Authority, as well as fundamental changes to the rules
of evidence in criminal proceedings.122
Perhaps most consequentially, its “truth in evidence”
provision abolished the state’s exclusionary rule, which excluded
the admission at trial of otherwise relevant evidence that the
state obtained through violation of the defendant’s rights.123 The
California Supreme Court had established the state’s
exclusionary rule in 1955 (before the U.S. Supreme Court
required states to comply with a federal exclusionary rule in
Mapp v. Ohio) and had expanded it over time to apply more

120 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #779: CRIME AND FEAR OF
CRIME NUMBER ONE COMMUNITY PROBLEM IN CALIFORNIA (Mar. 22, 1973); MERVIN D.
FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #780: ONE IN THREE CALIFORNIANS CLAIM TO
HAVE BEEN VICTIMIZED BY CRIME DURING PAST YEAR (Mar. 23, 1973).
121 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1236: HIGH DEGREE OF
PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT TWO STATE ISSUES: CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT; SCHOOLS
AND EDUCATION 1 (Feb. 23, 1984).
122 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: PRIMARY
ELECTION JUNE 8, 1982, at 32–33, 56 (1982).
123 Id. at 33.

Do Not Delete

2016]

3/5/2016 11:59 AM

The California Supreme Court and the Popular Will

175

broadly than the federal rule.124 The Victims’ Bill of Rights
initiative overturned that rule and instead provided that, under
state law, all relevant evidence would now be admissible at trial,
with exceptions for statutory rules of evidence such as hearsay
and privilege. California courts would now enforce only the
federal exclusionary rule, and would not be permitted to exclude
evidence more broadly under a separate, independent state
rule.125
George Deukmejian, now California Attorney General,
summarized the proponents’ arguments in the official California
ballot pamphlet:
Crime has increased to an absolutely intolerable level.
While criminals murder, rape, rob and steal, victims must install
new locks, bolts, bars and alarm systems in their homes and
businesses. Many buy tear gas and guns for self protection. FREE
PEOPLE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO LIVE IN FEAR.
Yet, higher courts in this state have created rights for the criminally
accused and placed more restrictions on law enforcement officers. This
proposition will overcome some of the adverse decisions by our higher
courts.126

Voters approved the measure by a 56.4–46.6% margin.
The measure was challenged in court shortly after the
election, and a closely divided California Supreme Court upheld
it. Justice Mosk dissented, lamenting: “The Goddess of Justice is
wearing a black arm-band today, as she weeps for the
Constitution of California.”127 The Victims’ Bill of Rights
initiative was a devastating blow for Mosk, an architect of the
new judicial federalism, because it wiped away a large body of
case law expanding state constitutional rights in the area of
criminal procedure, and restricted the court’s ability to innovate
in this area in the future.128
Eight years later, as crime rates remained high and public
concerns about crime persisted, the law enforcement community
drafted another initiative constitutional amendment to protect
124 See generally People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). As an example of its
expansive nature, the California exclusionary rule applied vicariously, that is, it granted
the defendant standing to object to the admission of evidence obtained in violation of a
third person’s constitutional rights. See People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (Cal. 1955).
For the U.S. Supreme Court ruling applying the exclusionary rule to the states, see Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
125 J. Clark Kelso & Brigitte A. Bass, The Victims’ Bill of Rights: Where Did It Come
from and How Much Did It Do?, 23 PAC. L.J. 843, 867–68 (1992).
126 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, supra note 122, at 34.
127 Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 313 (Cal. 1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
128 JACQUELINE R. BRAITMAN & GERALD F. UELMEN, JUSTICE STANLEY MOSK 155–57
(2013).
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crime victims and limit the procedural rights of criminal
defendants. This measure, known as the Crime Victims Justice
Reform Act, was designated as Proposition 115 on the state
ballot. Among other provisions, the measure sought to eliminate
or limit the procedural rights of criminal defendants, including
the defendant’s right against prosecutor’s pretrial discovery, the
defendant’s right to exclude hearsay at preliminary hearings,
and the defendant’s right to post-indictment preliminary
hearings. These provisions, again, would overturn rights
established by the California Supreme Court. Moreover, and
more radically, Proposition 115 sought to establish a “lock-step”
provision that would bar the California Supreme Court from
interpreting the California Constitution to recognize state
constitutional rights of criminal defendants beyond the
requirements of the U.S. Constitution—a direct and total
repudiation of the court’s new judicial federalism jurisprudence
in the area of criminal procedure.129 Voters embraced Proposition
115 by a 57–43% margin.130 As discussed further below, the
California Supreme Court upheld most of Proposition 115’s
provisions but invalidated its sweeping lock-step rule.131
B. Busing
The California Supreme Court’s decision to expand the
constitutional basis for desegregative busing again conflicted
with deeply held public views. By declaring that California’s
constitutional standard for desegregation would be more
stringent than the federal standard (that is, that remedies would
be required regardless of whether the segregation was
129 California Constitution article I, section 24, reads as follows: “Rights guaranteed
by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.” Proposition 115 sought to add the following amendment:
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to
due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with
counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to
confront the witnesses against him or her, to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against
himself or herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and
to not suffer the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed
by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the
United States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford
greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution
of the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to minors
in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the
Constitution of the United States.
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: PRIMARY
ELECTION JUNE 5, 1990, at 33 (1990).
130 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, supra note 111, at 51.
131 Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990); see also infra notes 176,
178.
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intentional), the court increased the prospects that many
students in the state would be bused in pursuit of racial
desegregation.132
Public opinion surveys indicated that California voters
overwhelmingly opposed the busing of public school students to
achieve racial balance. In a June 1979 Field poll, 79% of
respondents said that they were opposed to busing, compared to
only 14% who supported it.133 A September 1979 Field Poll
further underscored the state’s overwhelming opposition to
busing. Field noted:
The public itself is quite clear about where it stands on the basic
idea of school busing to achieve racial balance. There is a four to one
majority against the idea, and very few people are neutral or
undecided.
Opposition to busing pervades all areas of the state, all political
partisanship groups, all levels of education, and is not affected by
whether any family members are in the schools or their propensity to
vote.134

Both white and Hispanic voters heavily opposed busing, while
black voters were evenly divided on the remedy.135
Opposition to court-ordered busing was especially intense in
the suburban areas of the sprawling Los Angeles Unified School
District. Legislators representing that area, including Democrat
Alan Robbins, led a bipartisan effort to place a constitutional
amendment on the ballot to overturn the court’s decision.136 The
amendment, which became Proposition 1 of 1979, proposed a
lengthy amendment to the state constitution’s due process and
equal protection clauses (article I, section 7(a)), to limit their
independent force in the area of desegregation.137 The amended
clauses would read as follows:
A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that

132 See Crawford v. Board of Education of L.A., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976), which
affirmed the court’s principles for school desegregation set forth in dicta in
Jackson v. Pasadena City School District, 382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963). For discussion of the
Crawford context, see PREBLE STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD
AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 34 (1981).
133 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1031: CALIFORNIANS
OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSED TO SCHOOL BUSING (June 14, 1979).
134 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1043: LARGE MAJORITY
OPPOSES SCHOOL BUSING, BUT MOST OF PUBLIC EITHER UNAWARE OF PROP. 1 (ROBBINS
AMENDMENT) OR HAVE CONFLICTING VIEWS AS TO ITS EFFECTS 1 (Sept. 21, 1979).
135 Id.
136 STOLZ, supra note 132, at 33–37.
137 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: SPECIAL
STATEWIDE ELECTION NOVEMBER 6, 1979, at 6–7 (1979).
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nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes
upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any
obligations or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or
pupil transportation. In enforcing this subdivision or any other
provision of this Constitution, no court of this State may impose upon
the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any
obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school
assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific
violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under
federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon
such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.138

The Legislature placed the amendment on the ballot through
a bipartisan, supermajority vote of 62–17 in the Assembly and
28–6 in the Senate.139 Voters approved the measure by a
68.6−31.4% margin.140
Progressive opponents of the amendment challenged it on
federal constitutional grounds. In Crawford v. Board of
Education of L.A. (1982),141 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
people’s decision to override the state supreme court. Justice
Lewis Powell wrote:
We . . . reject[] the contention that once a State chooses to do “more”
than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede. We
reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so destructive
of a State’s democratic processes and of its ability to experiment. This
interpretation has no support in the decisions of this Court. . . .
In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Federal
Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the standard
prevailing generally throughout the United States.142

C. Other Rights—No Direct Challenges to the Court’s Rulings
As noted above, during the early years of the new judicial
federalism, the California Supreme Court expanded rights
beyond federal minimums in a range of other areas, including
abortion, gender equality, sexual orientation equality, equalized
education funding, free speech, and non-establishment of
religion. Polling information is not available for all of these
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, supra note 112.
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of L.A., 458 U.S. 527, 535, 542 (1982).
Id.
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issues, but the existing data suggest that decisions generally
aligned with public opinion; at the very least, the court’s
decisions in these cases did not run counter to broad, strongly
held opinion.
Polling was most extensive on the question of abortion.
During the period that the California Supreme Court led the
nation in expanding abortion rights, through People v. Belous
(1969)143 and People v. Barksdale (1972),144 polls indicated that
Californians broadly supported liberalizing abortion laws. A May
1967 Field Poll found that 73% of respondents favored changes to
the state’s long-standing abortion law which allowed abortions
only when the pregnant woman’s life was at risk.145 The court’s
1969 ruling in Belous declared that law unconstitutional. After
the Legislature adopted the Therapeutic Abortion Act of 1967,
which allowed abortion where the pregnancy could impair the
physical or mental health of the mother or where the pregnancy
was the result of rape or incest, polls indicated that the public
favored even further liberalization.146 A majority of respondents
would allow abortion “if [the] baby might have a serious
deformity,” but did not fully support abortion on demand.147 The
California electorate was thus substantially pro-choice on
abortion prior to Roe v. Wade, during the time that the California
Supreme Court was establishing a constitutional basis for the
pro-choice position.
Later, the abortion controversy turned to public funding for
abortion, and in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights
v. Myers (1981),148 the California Supreme Court declared that
the state constitution’s protection of abortion rights included the
right to public funding for abortion. This outcome was opposite of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Harris v. McRae (1980),
which rejected a claim to a federal constitutional right to public
funding for abortion.149 Shortly after the McRae decision, and a
year before Myers, a poll indicated that Californians continued to
support abortion rights generally, and were evenly divided on the
question of whether the state should keep funding abortions

See People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 204–06 (Cal. 1969).
See People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257, 270 (Cal. 1972).
MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #556: LIBERALIZING ABORTION
LAWS IS FAVORED BY AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF CALIFORNIA VOTERS 1–2 (May 9,
1967).
146 S.B. 462, 1967–1968 Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1967).
147 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #633: CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
FAVORS SLIGHT LIBERALIZATION OF ABORTION LAWS, BUT NO MORE 2 (May 20, 1969).
148 Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
149 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
143
144
145
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(48% yes, 48% no, with 4% undecided).150 Opponents of Myers did
not organize an effort to overturn it through a state
constitutional amendment.
While the Field Poll did not track California public opinion
on gender equality at the time of the Sail’er Inn decision
(1971),151 the Legislature voted to ratify the Federal Equal Rights
Amendment in November 1972, shortly after it was referred to
the states, and in 1980, nearly two-thirds of respondents (64%)
favored the amendment.152 The Sail’er Inn decision faced no
organized override effort. Similarly, by the time of the court’s
decision in Gay Law Students (1979),153 public opinion in
California had moved in favor of non-discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation in the workplace. In 1978 California voters
soundly rejected a ballot measure that would have restricted
employment of gays and lesbians in the public schools, and did
not mobilize opposition to the court’s Gay Law Students ruling
the following year.154
The public also accepted the court’s decisions to expand
rights beyond federal minimums in areas including free speech
on private property, non-establishment of religion, and
equalization of school funding.155 Each of these cases generated
some controversy, but none of them countered strongly held
public views in the manner of the court’s capital punishment,
criminal procedure, and busing decisions.

150 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1091: CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL BAN ON ABORTIONS. EVENLY DIVIDED ON MEDI-CAL ABORTIONS
PAYMENTS 1–2 (Aug. 19, 1980).
151 Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971).
152 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1089: STRONG SUPPORT FOR
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT. REAGAN’S FAILURE TO ENDORSE IT MIGHT ADVERSELY
AFFECT HIS CHANCES IF PRESIDENTIAL RACE TIGHTENS 1, 3 (Aug. 12, 1980).
153 Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
154 For text and analysis of Proposition 6 of 1978 (the “Briggs Initiative”), see CAL.
SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 7, 1978, at 28–31 (1978). The measure was defeated 58.4–41.6%. See CAL.
SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 7,
1978 (1978).
155 Some argue that one additional rights-expanding decision from this era, Serrano
v. Priest, produced indirect pushback from voters. Serrano created a state constitutional
right to equalized school funding in and de-linked local property taxes from the funding of
local public schools. Although citizens did not mobilize to overturn Serrano, they did
overwhelmingly support Proposition 13 of 1978, which reduced property taxes and placed
strict limits on future increases. Some analysts believe that voters supported Proposition
13 at least in part because, as a result of the court’s ruling, their property taxes no longer
directly supported their local schools. While this theory is plausible, polls do not confirm
that the public made this connection and it cannot be said that Proposition 13
“overturned” Serrano in the way that, for example, Proposition 17 overturned People
v. Anderson. See DANIEL A. SMITH, TAX CRUSADERS AND THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY 60 (1998).
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D. Judicial Retention Elections and the Death of the Bird Court
The tensions between the state supreme court and the
electorate came to a head in 1986 when six of the court’s seven
justices faced judicial retention elections. The six justices on the
ballot that year were Chief Justice Rose Bird, Justice Cruz
Reynoso, Justice Joseph Grodin, Justice Stanley Mosk, Justice
Edward Panelli, and Justice Malcolm Lucas.156 By 1986, Chief
Justice Bird had served on the court for nearly a decade, and had
been a lightning rod for criticism the entire time.157 She narrowly
won popular confirmation in 1978, receiving 52% of the vote, by
far the lowest percentage any California Supreme Court justice
had received in a confirmation or retention election since the
system was established in 1934.158 After surviving that election,
she remained a target. Opponents organized several efforts to
recall her in 1981–1983, but each failed to qualify for the
ballot.159 Thereafter, public opposition to Bird continued to
spread, and in mid-1985, opponents, including district attorneys
and correctional officers, launched a campaign to defeat her in
the 1986 retention election.160 Between mid-1985 and the fall
1986 election, Field conducted eight separate polls measuring
public attitudes toward the chief justice. The polls consistently
showed that a substantial majority of voters were determined to
remove her from office. When asked why they wanted to remove
Chief Justice Bird, respondents mentioned, in order of frequency,
that they did not like her opposition to the death penalty; they
considered her too lenient and soft on criminals; they believed
she let killers go free; they did not like her positions and stands
on the issues; they thought she had not upheld the will of the
people or enforced the law; they concluded that she had not done
a good job; and they considered her too liberal—followed by other
criticisms.161
156 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 4, 1986, at 36–37 (1986). For Justice Grodin’s account of the 1986 judicial
election, see GRODIN, supra note 96, at 169–81.
157 Barry Latzer, California’s Constitutional Counterrevolution, in CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN THE STATES 149, 166 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996).
158 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, supra note 156; GRODIN, supra note 96, at
167–68.
159 See Complete List of Recall Attempts, CAL. SECRETARY ST. ALEX PADILLA,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/recalls/complete-list-recall-attempts/ [http://perma.cc/NK3
K-LEP5]; see also Richard Bergholz, Effort to Recall Rose Bird Puts State GOP in a
Quandary, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1982, at B3.
160 The Dolphin Group, a political campaign firm, managed the effort. In addition to
law enforcement organizations, the campaign received support from business groups,
agricultural interests, and the Republican Party. See Frank Clifford & John Balzar,
2 Groups Join Forces in Seeking Bird’s Defeat, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1986, at A20; see also
GRODIN, supra note 96, at 169.
161 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1362: BY A FIVE TO THREE
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Voters were angry at the chief justice and, to a lesser degree,
other members of the court, for many reasons, but the divide
between the people and the court on the issue of capital
punishment was the single biggest irritant. Many voters thought
they had settled the question of the legitimacy of the death
penalty under the California Constitution in 1972, when they
had reversed the court’s ruling in Anderson.162 But the
controversy had persisted. After capital punishment was
reinstated in California and juries had sentenced scores of
convicted felons to death, the state supreme court had reversed
nearly all of the sentences, often on technicalities. Several
members of the court’s progressive wing had not fully accepted
the voters’ verdict in overturning Anderson and affirming capital
punishment. Rose Bird was the most resistant. During her
tenure on the court, she participated in the review of sixty-one
capital convictions, and voted to overturn the sentence in all
sixty-one of them.163 Meanwhile, by 1986, voter support for
capital punishment had spiked to 83%, with only 14% opposed—a
remarkably broad consensus.164 The chief justice and the public
were polarized on this emotional and high-profile issue. As
opposition to Bird hardened, it was apparent that voters would
remove her; it was less certain whether they would also reject
one or more of her progressive colleagues. Veteran liberal justice
Stanley Mosk escaped, but two other progressives, Cruz Reynoso
and Joseph Grodin, were not so fortunate. On Election Day,
voters defeated Bird, Reynoso, and Grodin—and thus, in one
stroke, decimated the court’s progressive majority.
Table 4: Results of 1986 California Supreme Court Elections165
Justice

Appointing Governor

Outcome

% Yes Vote

Justice Malcolm Lucas

George Deukmejian (R)

Confirmed

80

Justice Edward Panelli

George Deukmejian (R)

Confirmed

79

Justice Stanley Mosk

Pat Brown (D)

Retained

74

Justice Joseph Grodin

Jerry Brown (D)

Defeated

43

Justice Cruz Reynoso

Jerry Brown (D)

Defeated

40

Chief Justice Rose Bird

Jerry Brown (D)

Defeated

34

MARGIN, VOTERS STILL OPPOSED TO RETAINING ROSE BIRD 2 (Oct. 9, 1986).
162 Dan Morain, Both Sides Point to Death Penalty Decision of 1972, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
18, 1986, at A3.
163 Todd S. Purdum, Rose Bird, Once California’s Chief Justice, Is Dead at 63, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at B18.
164 MERVIN D. FIELD, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, RELEASE #1353: STRONG OPPOSITION TO
ROSE BIRD CONTINUES. CONFIRMATION OF ALL OTHER JUSTICES FAVORED 3 (Aug. 12,
1986).
165 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, SUPPLEMENTAL VOTE COUNT STATISTICS
CONCERNING THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 4, 1986
(1986).
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IV. AFTER THE FALL: THE LUCAS COURT
The dismissal of Chief Justice Bird and Justices Reynoso and
Grodin, on November 4, 1986, produced three vacancies on the
court. George Deukmejian, the long-time critic of the court’s
jurisprudence, was elected to a second term as Governor the
same day, and now had the opportunity to reconstitute the court
in line with his vision of the California Constitution and the
court’s proper role in the state’s constitutional design.
George Deukmejian’s public career—as a state legislator,
Attorney General, and Governor—spanned from 1963 to 1991, a
period of intensifying public concern about crime and lenient
courts. Of all elected officials in California during these years, he
most consistently and effectively supported tough-on-crime
measures and opposed the court’s progressive orientation,
especially on criminal justice issues.166 While serving as Attorney
General, Deukmejian publicly attacked what he considered to be
the court’s excessive embrace of the new judicial federalism—
that is, its frequent use of independent state grounds to expand
rights.167 When he ran for Governor, Deukmejian remarked that
he was motivated to seek the office because the Governor, not the
Attorney General, is the one who appoints judges.168 He wanted
to appoint what he called “no-nonsense” judges, those who would
show deference to the political branches, use self-restraint in
exercising the power of judicial review, and not unnecessarily
invoke the state constitution to expand rights.169 During his two
terms as Governor (1983–1991), Deukmejian nominated more
than 1000 judges, including eight members of the California
Supreme Court: Malcolm Lucas (1984–1996, chief justice
1987−1996); Edward A. Panelli (1985–1994); John A. Arguellas
(1987–1989); David N. Eagleson (1987–1991); Marcus M.
Kaufman (1987–1990); Joyce L. Kennard (1989–2014); Armand
Arabian (1990–1996); and Marvin R. Baxter (1991–2015).170
Governor Deukmejian’s nominees to the state’s highest court
had several common characteristics. First, they were seasoned
jurists. All of his nominees had served as lower court judges, and
166 Kenneth Ofgang, Personality Profile: George Deukmejian: East Coast Transplant
Who Rose to Governorship Looks Back at Life of Service, METROPOLITAN
NEWS-ENTERPRISE 3 (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.metnews.com/articles/2012/deuk0117
12.htm [perma.cc/4QZF-FFWC].
167 See, e.g., George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No
Anchor—Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975
(1979).
168 Ofgang, supra note 166.
169 Daniel M. Weintraub & Jennifer Warren, Benchmarks: Governor Keeps Tight Rein
on Who Will Become Judge, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1988, at AD1.
170 California Supreme Court Justices, supra note 9.
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most had “gone through the chairs”—that is, served as both trial
court judge and as justice on the state’s intermediate court of
appeal before being elevated to the state supreme court. Second,
they were generally moderate-conservatives; none was a
“movement conservative” who would seek to launch an
ideological counterrevolution from the right. Third, they were
practitioners, not law professors or theoreticians. In short, their
backgrounds and jurisprudential orientations made them less
likely to embrace the new judicial federalism, and more likely to
limit the court’s role in expanding new constitutional rights.
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas, the
court stabilized and repaired its legitimacy. At the same time,
the court retained its national influence, as it continued to be
highly cited by courts in other states.171 The Lucas years
produced no deep conflicts between the court and the people and
no organized efforts to remove justices. While the Lucas court
was reticent to create new state constitutional rights, it also was
generally careful not to overturn prior decisions establishing
such rights.172 The court reversed some progressive precedents in
the common law, especially in the area of tort, and upheld death
sentences at much increased rates through modification of the
harmless error rule.173 But the Lucas court did not undo, for
example, prior rulings in state constitutional rights cases such as
Serrano v. Priest II (1976),174 requiring school funding
equalization, or Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers (1981),175 requiring public funding for abortion.
Moreover, the Lucas court handed down a decision in Raven v.
Deukmejian (1990) that defended the core principle of the new
judicial federalism, namely that state supreme courts should be
able to interpret state constitutional rights independently of U.S.
Supreme Court interpretation of federal constitutional rights.176
As discussed above, in 1990 voters approved Proposition 115, the
Crime Victims Justice Reform Act. That initiative contained
several specific limitations on the rights of criminal defendants,
as well as a “lock-step” provision, which provided that the
California Constitution “shall not be construed by the courts to
afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded

Dear & Jessen, supra note 8, at 701.
John H. Culver, The Transformation of the California Supreme Court: 1977-1997,
61 ALB. L. REV. 1461, 1476–77 (1998).
173 J. Clark Kelso, A Tribute to Retiring Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas, 27 PAC. L.J.
1401 (1996).
174 Serrano v. Priest II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977).
175 Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
176 Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
171
172
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by the Constitution of the United States.”177 The court upheld the
separate restrictions on defendant rights, but struck down the
lock-step provision. In the court’s view, the lock-step rule would
so restrict the power of the state judicial branch and so “severely
limit[] the independent force and effect of the California
Constitution” as to be a “revision” of the state constitution rather
than an amendment, and therefore impermissible under the
limits of the initiative process.178 The most conservative court in
modern California history thus protected the core institutional
principle of the new judicial federalism.
V. THE GEORGE COURT: REVIVAL OF THE NEW JUDICIAL
FEDERALISM AND POPULAR PUSH-BACK
In 1990, Republican Pete Wilson won election to replace
George Deukmejian as Governor of California. Wilson was known
as a moderate Republican, more liberal than Deukmejian on
social issues, and prominently pro-choice on abortion. During his
two terms as Governor (1991–1999), Wilson nominated four
justices to the California Supreme Court: Ronald M. George
(1991–2011, chief justice 1996–2011); Kathryn M. Werdegar
(1994–present); Ming W. Chin (1996–present); and Janice Rogers
Brown (1996–2005).179 Of the four, Janice Rogers Brown was
considered the most conservative—a movement conservative. But
the other three were more moderate. Collectively, Wilson’s
appointees moved the court to more progressive positions on
some issues and revived the court’s expansion of state
constitutional rights in the areas of abortion, same-sex marriage,
and gay rights beyond marriage.
Table 5: New California State Constitutional Rights, Post-1986,
and Overriding Amendments180
Category
Abortion

New State
Constitutional
Rights
Right of minors
to abortion
without parental
notification

Cases
Establishing
Rights
American
Academy of
Pediatrics v.
Lungren (1997)

Overriding
Amendments

Vote

Prop. 73 (2005)
Prop. 85 (2006)
Prop. 4 (2008)

Fail (47.2–52.8%)
Fail (45.8–54.2%)
Fail (48.0–52.0%)

CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE MARCH FONG EU, supra note 129.
Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086, 1088; see also John Dinan, Court-Constraining
Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983, 1015–16 (2007).
179 California Supreme Court Justices, supra note 9.
180 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE BRUCE MCPHERSON, STATEMENT OF VOTE: SPECIAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 8, 2005, at 3 (2005); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE BRUCE MCPHERSON, STATEMENT OF
VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 7, 2006, at 73 (2006); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE DEBRA
BOWEN, STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 4, 2008, at 59, 62 (2008).
177
178
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New State
Constitutional
Rights
Marriage Right of same-sex
couples to marry
Equal
Strict scrutiny for
protection laws that classify
on basis of sexual
orientation

Category

Cases
Establishing
Rights
In re Marriage
Cases (2008)
In re Marriage
Cases (2008)

[Vol. 19:1

Overriding
Amendments

Vote

Prop. 8 (2008)

Pass (52.2–47.8%)

—

—

A. Abortion Rights
The court signaled a shift in direction on abortion rights in
1996–1997, shortly after Ronald George succeeded Malcolm
Lucas as chief justice. The case in question concerned a
Deukmejian-era statute requiring a pregnant minor to obtain the
consent of her parents (or a judge) before obtaining an abortion.
After the U.S. Supreme Court held in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) that such parental
consent laws did not violate the U.S. Constitution, opponents of
the California law challenged the statute on state constitutional
grounds in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren.181 When
the court first considered the Lungren case in 1996, it upheld the
statute by a narrow four-to-three decision authored by Justice
Mosk.182 But when Chief Justice Lucas retired, Governor Wilson
nominated Ronald George to replace him and Ming Chin to
replace George as associate justice. With these changes on the
bench, the narrowly divided court reversed the outcome. The
court granted rehearing in May 1996 and, in a new decision
issued the following year, invalidated the parental consent law.183
The new decision, authored by Chief Justice George, held that
the California Constitution’s right to privacy included the right of
a minor to terminate her pregnancy without parental consent—
thereby again expanding California’s state constitutional
abortion rights beyond the federal baseline.184 Recognizing the
potential backlash against the decision, George stated: “I thought
it was important to decide the case the way it should be decided.
And I assigned it to myself as a sign I would not be
intimidated.”185
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992).
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 912 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1996), vacated, 940 P.2d
797 (Cal. 1997).
183 Lungren, 940 P.2d at 831. For a discussion of the court’s switch in the case, see
Edward J. Erler, The California Supreme Court in the Culture Wars, in COURTS AND THE
CULTURE WARS 139, 141–45 (Bradley C.S. Watson ed., 2002).
184 Lungren, 940 P.2d at 809–10, 813–14.
185 MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, THE FIELD POLL, RELEASE #1852: CHIEF
JUSTICE RONALD GEORGE’S RULING COULD AFFECT HIS CONFIRMATION CHANCES NEXT
181
182
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Pro-life activists were outraged by the new Lungren decision
and resolved to seek to defeat Chief Justice George and Associate
Justice Chin in their upcoming confirmation elections, scheduled
for November 1998.186 However, public opinion was much less
hostile to the George court’s ruling on this issue than it had been
to the court’s criminal justice jurisprudence during the
Wright-Bird era. Polls indicated that the California electorate
had complex views about abortion (related to the stage and
circumstances of the pregnancy) but leaned heavily toward the
pro-choice position. Although some polls indicated that the public
supported the idea of a parental consent law, others showed that
large majorities of Californians consistently favored abortion
rights.187 Accordingly, while it was possible that voters might
narrowly approve an initiative constitutional amendment to
override the court’s decision in Lungren, it was unlikely that the
public would mobilize to remove a justice who issued a pro-choice
decision. Indeed, the movement to defeat Chief Justice George
and Associate Justice Chin (who had tipped the balance in the
case) gained little traction. At the 1998 election, voters confirmed
Chin by a 69% popular majority, George by more than 75%.
Table 6: Results of 1998 California Supreme Court
Judicial Elections188
Justice

Appointing Governor

Outcome

% Yes Vote

Justice Janice Rogers Brown

Pete Wilson (R)

Confirmed

75.91

Chief Justice Ron George

Pete Wilson (R)

Confirmed

75.49

Justice Stanley Mosk

Pat Brown (D)

Retained

70.51

Justice Ming Chin

Pete Wilson (R)

Confirmed

69.26

After the challenges to George and Chin foundered, activists
turned to the initiative process to try to overturn the court’s
Lungren decision through state constitutional amendment, not
once, or twice, but three times: in 2005 (Proposition 73); 2006
(Proposition 85); and 2008 (Proposition 4). California voters
narrowly defeated the measures each time, demonstrating that
the court’s decision in Lungren was closely enough aligned with
the electorate’s views to avoid popular override.

YEAR 4 (Sept. 4, 1997).
186 Id. at 1.
187 Id. at 4; see also MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, THE FIELD POLL, RELEASE
#1747: LARGE MAJORITY TAKES PRO-CHOICE POSITION ON ABORTION, DECLINE IN SUPPORT
FOR MEDI-CAL ABORTION PAYMENTS 1 (Mar. 17, 1995); MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN
FIELD, THE FIELD POLL, RELEASE #1863: STRONG SUPPORT FOR AND INITIATIVE WHICH
WOULD REQUIRE A MINOR OBTAINING PARENTAL CONSENT BEFORE HAVING AN ABORTION
(Dec. 12, 1997).
188 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE BILL JONES, STATE OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER
3, 1998 (1998).
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B. Same-Sex Marriage
The George court is best known for its rulings on the
contested question of same-sex marriage, especially its landmark
decision in In re Marriage Cases (2008), establishing a state
constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry.189 At the time
the California Supreme Court considered the question, the
U.S. Supreme Court had not yet held that same-sex couples had
a federal constitutional right to marry. To the contrary, the Court
had rejected such a claim in 1972, and had never squarely
revisited the question.190 The Supreme Court had issued other
decisions protecting the federal constitutional rights of gay and
lesbian persons in decisions such as Romer v. Evans (1996)191 and
Lawrence v. Texas (2003),192 but strategists for the gay rights
movement believed that the Court was not yet prepared to issue
a broad decision granting same-sex couples federal constitutional
marriage rights, a decision that would require the Court to
overturn existing marriage laws across the country.193 Instead,
the movement pursued a “new judicial federalism strategy”—that
is, it turned to state supreme courts in progressive states to
declare that their state constitution protected the right of
same-sex couples to marry.194 In the tradition of the new judicial
federalism, this approach called upon state courts to expand
rights beyond what was, at the time, the federal constitutional
standard.
The movement had a breakthrough in Massachusetts in
2003 when the Supreme Judicial Court declared that the
Massachusetts Constitution guaranteed the right of same-sex
couples to marry. Advocates of same-sex marriage pursued
similar rulings in other states, but with little initial success. The
supreme courts of New York (2006),195 Washington (2006),196 and
Maryland (2007)197 refused to recognize a state constitutional
right of same-sex marriage. The New Jersey Supreme Court held
that the state’s marriage laws violated the state constitution’s
equal protection principles, but narrowly held that civil unions
for same-sex partners was a sufficient remedy.198 As of 2008,

In re Marriage Cases, 83 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
193 See generally William C. Duncan, Avoidance Strategy: Same-Sex Marriage
Litigation and the Federal Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 29 (2006).
194 Id.
195 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006).
196 Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006).
197 Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).
198 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
189
190
191
192
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Massachusetts remained the only state to recognize same-sex
marriages.
The battle then shifted to California. In 2007–2008, the
California Supreme Court deliberated on the question through
review of a group of six consolidated appeals titled In re Marriage
Cases.199 The California litigation proceeded in the midst of
shifting public opinion. In 2000, the state’s voters had approved a
statutory initiative, Proposition 22, establishing that “only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California,” by a wide 61–39% majority.200 Table 7 demonstrates
that over the next eight years public opinion in California moved
toward greater acceptance of same-sex marriage, but remained
sharply divided on the question. The combination of the state’s
highly accessible system of initiative constitutional amendment,
divided public opinion, and a mobilized conservative opposition to
same-sex marriage meant that a decision by the court to
establish a new state constitutional right of same-sex couples to
marry would likely face a serious challenge. And, indeed, as the
court was reviewing the case, conservative defenders of existing
marriage laws were preparing an initiative to embed in the state
constitution the principle, approved by voters eight years before,
that “only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or
recognized in California.”201 The amendment was designed to
override the court in the same way that, a generation before,
voters had overturned the court’s decisions on capital
punishment, criminal procedure, and busing.
For nearly four decades, the Field Research Corporation has
surveyed California voters’ attitudes toward same-sex marriage
and has recorded a major shift in public attitudes in favor of
marriage rights for same-sex couples.
As Table 7 indicates, in early 2008, the California Supreme
Court reasonably could have concluded that public opinion had
moved far enough in California that the electorate would accept a
landmark ruling granting marriage rights to same-sex couples.
When the court issued its decision in Marriage Cases on May 15,
2008, it put the question to the test. The proponents of the
override measure qualified it for the November 2008 election
under the ballot designation “Proposition 8.”

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE BILL JONES, STATEMENT OF VOTE: PRIMARY ELECTION,
MARCH 7, 2000, at 50–53, 153–55 (2000).
201 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE,
CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2008, at 54 (2008). The
amendment would become California Constitution article I, section 7.5.
199
200
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Table 7: Public Opinion of Same-Sex Marriage in
California, 1977–2013202
Year
1977
1985
1997
2003
2004
2006
May 2008
May 2008
2009
2010
2012
2013

% Approve
28
30
38
42
44
44
51
49
51
59
61

% Disapprove
59
62
56
50
50
50
In re Marriage Cases
42
44
42
34
32

% No Opinion
13
8
6
8
6
6
7
7
7
7
7

The campaign for and against the amendment was one of
the most intense and expensive in state history. Both sides of the
issue presented forceful arguments. Opponents of Proposition 8
framed the issue largely in terms of rights and emphasized that
the voters should not take away the rights of gay and lesbian
couples, while proponents framed the issue in terms of popular
sovereignty and argued that the people, not the court, should
determine this fundamental social question.203 In the ballot
pamphlet argument, the measure’s proponents directly targeted
the court:
Proposition 8 is simple and straightforward. It contains the same 14
words that were previously approved in 2000 by over 61% of
California voters: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California.”
Because four activist judges in San Francisco wrongly overturned
the people’s vote, we need to pass this measure as a constitutional
amendment to RESTORE THE DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE as a
man and a woman.204

Despite the broad trend in public opinion in California
toward acceptance of same-sex marriage the state’s voters
approved Proposition 8, and thus overturned In re Marriage
Cases, by a narrow 52–48% margin.205 Passage of the amendment
202 MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, THE FIELD POLL, RELEASE #2443: RECORD
MAJORITY OF CALIFORNIA VOTERS APPROVES OF ALLOWING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 2 (Feb.
28, 2013) [hereinafter RELEASE #2443].
203 For a discussion of the competing arguments and spending in the Prop. 8 election,
see Kenneth P. Miller, The Democratic Coalition’s Religious Divide: Why California Voters
Supported Obama, but Not Same-Sex Marriage, REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ÉTUDES
AMÉRICAINES 46–62 (2009).
204 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, supra note 201, at 56.
205 CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION

Do Not Delete

2016]

3/5/2016 11:59 AM

The California Supreme Court and the Popular Will

191

produced new rounds of litigation in state and federal courts. The
first case involved a state constitutional challenge to Proposition
8 titled Strauss v. Horton (2009).206 The petitioners argued that it
was impermissible to take away a fundamental state
constitutional right through the initiative process because such
an action amounted to a revision of the state constitution. By a
six-to-one majority, however, the California Supreme Court
rejected the claim and upheld a central principle of state
constitutionalism—namely, that the people have the power to
define state constitutional rights and can override the court’s
definition of a state-level right.207 Immediately after the Strauss
ruling, opponents of Proposition 8 filed a challenge in federal
court.208 This move finally shifted from state to federal court the
question of whether there is a constitutional right to same sex
marriage. After extensive litigation, the federal courts struck
down Proposition 8 on federal constitutional grounds and, later,
all state laws that limited marriage to a union between a man
and a woman.209

NOVEMBER 4, 2008, at 7 (2008).
206 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
207 In Strauss, Chief Justice George noted:
Under the California Constitution, the constitutional guarantees afforded to
individuals accused of criminal conduct are no less well established or
fundamental than the constitutional rights of privacy and due process or the
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. As we have seen, in past years a
majority of voters has adopted several state constitutional amendments—for
example, the measure reinstating the death penalty, and the multitude of
constitutional changes contained in the 1982 Proposition 8 and in Proposition
115—that have diminished state constitutional rights of criminal defendants,
as those rights had been interpreted in prior decisions of this court. Although a
principal purpose of all constitutional provisions establishing individual rights
is to serve as a counter-majoritarian check on potential actions that may be
taken by the legislative or executive branches, our prior decisions—reviewed at
length above—establish that the scope and substance of an existing state
constitutional individual right, as interpreted by this court, may be modified
and diminished by a change in the state Constitution itself, effectuated
through a constitutional amendment approved by a majority of the electors
acting pursuant to the initiative power.
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 450 (internal citations omitted).
208 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
209 In Perry, a federal district judge declared that Proposition 8 violated the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of the appeal on
the grounds that the proponents of the initiative lacked Article III standing to defend a
citizen initiative where state officials refused to do so. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013). After the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Hollingsworth and, more
importantly, in United States v. Windsor, federal courts around the country began issuing
decisions in cases challenging state marriage laws. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013). When the issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, the
Court recognized a federal constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry, thus

Do Not Delete

192

3/5/2016 11:59 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 19:1

As Table 7 indicates, during this period, public opinion
continued to move toward acceptance of same-sex marriage to the
point where it was likely that if the issue had been placed on the
California ballot as early as 2010, and certainly by 2012, voters
would have endorsed the right of same-sex couples to marry
through the democratic process. According to an early 2013 Field
Poll, California voters supported allowing same-sex couples to
marry by a near two-to-one margin (61% to 32%).210 Accordingly,
the California Supreme Court could have avoided popular
override of its judgment if it had stayed its hand and allowed the
people to resolve the question by democratic means.211
C. Gay Rights Beyond Marriage
Proposition 8 left untouched an important feature of In re
Marriage Cases, namely the court’s ruling that, henceforth in
California, all classifications based on sexual orientation will be
considered suspect and will be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny.212 This standard extends the state constitution’s equal
protection guarantees for gays and lesbians beyond federal
constitutional requirements. Although the U.S. Supreme Court
has invoked federal equal protection principles to invalidate laws
that draw distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation in cases
such as Romer v. Evans213 and United States v. Windsor,214 the
Court has never held that sexual orientation classifications are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny. In Marriage Cases, the

foreclosing further state constitutional deliberation on the question. Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
210 RELEASE #2443, supra note 202, at 2.
211 In his dissenting opinion in In re Marriage Cases, Justice Marvin Baxter advanced
this argument:
Left to its own devices, the ordinary democratic process might well produce, ere
long, a consensus among most Californians that the term ‘marriage’ should, in
civil parlance, include the legal unions of same-sex partners.
But a bare majority of this court, not satisfied with the pace of democratic
change, now abruptly forestalls that process and substitutes, by judicial fiat,
its own social policy views for those expressed by the People themselves.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 457 (Cal. 2008).
212 For establishment of the rule, see id. at 435–44. In Strauss, the court emphasized
that the rule remains in place. Writing for the court, Chief Justice George declared:
As we have seen, in the Marriage Cases the majority opinion held that sexual
orientation constitutes a suspect classification for purposes of analysis under
the state equal protection clause and that statutes according differential
treatment on the basis of sexual orientation are subject to the strict scrutiny
standard of review. These general state equal protection principles established
in the Marriage Cases are unaffected by the new section added to the
California Constitution by Proposition 8.
Strauss, 207 P.3d at 411.
213 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
214 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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California Supreme Court declared that the California
Constitution mandates such scrutiny. Although the people,
through Proposition 8, overturned that case’s core holding that
same-sex couples have a right to marry, they did not disturb the
court’s broader ruling imposing strict scrutiny for distinctions
based on sexual orientation.215
The court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to sexual
orientation cases parallels its 1971 decision in Sail’er Inn
v. Kirby to extend strict scrutiny to gender classifications.216 And,
just as the California electorate broadly supports gender
equality, it also generally supports equal rights for gays and
lesbians. Setting aside the specific controversy over the definition
of marriage, there was no organized opposition to the court’s
extension of strict scrutiny to classifications based on sexual
orientation.
In sum, the George court (1997–2011) can be characterized
as relatively centrist in the arena of rights. Although it issued
progressive, rights-expanding decisions in the areas of abortion
and gay rights (and, thus, was less conservative than the Lucas
court), it did not establish new rights with the same frequency as
the Wright and Bird courts. The people overturned the George
court’s rights decisions only once, narrowly, through Proposition
8 of 2008, and never mounted an effective campaign to remove its
members from the bench.
VI. THE NEW COURT
A. Transition to a More Progressive Court
When Chief Justice George announced his retirement in
2010, Governor Schwarzenegger nominated as his replacement
Tani Cantil-Sakauye, a respected state appellate judge generally
considered to be a moderate-conservative.217 Upon Chief Justice
Cantil-Sakauye’s selection, Republican governors had made
sixteen of the last seventeen nominations to the court, including
two nominations each of Malcolm Lucas and Ronald George. The
only exception was Democratic Governor Gray Davis’ nomination
of Justice Carlos Moreno in 2001. The long stretch of Republican
nominees came to an end in 2010, however, with Democrat Jerry
Brown’s election to a third term.

Strauss, 207 P.3d at 396.
See Sail’er Inn v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 539 (Cal. 1971).
Maura Dolan, Gov. Chooses Moderate for Chief Justice, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/22/local/la-me-0722-chief-justice-20100722 [perma.cc/
M6CN-JWLX].
215
216
217

Do Not Delete

194

3/5/2016 11:59 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 19:1

Between 2011 and 2014, Brown nominated three new
justices to the court—Goodwin Liu (2011–present),
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar (2015–present), and Leondra Kruger
(2015–present).218 These new justices are progressive,
academically oriented, and—by supreme court standards—young
(all three were born in the 1970s). None had prior judicial
experience before joining the court. Due to their elite academic
credentials and youth some observers believe that each of them
has the potential to be nominated to the U.S. Supreme Court.219
The new generation of Brown justices does not yet constitute
a majority of the court, but in the short term they can be
expected to form coalitions with centrist colleagues, especially
Justice Werdegar, on some issues.220 Moreover, future
nominations by Jerry Brown or his successors may soon produce
a progressive majority to rival the one that dominated the court
in the 1970s and early 1980s.
B.

Prospects for a Renewed New Judicial Federalism in California
As the California Supreme Court enters a transition to a new
era, the prospects for a revival of a 1970s-style new judicial
federalism remains uncertain. Although the court has an
opportunity to pursue that goal, it will face obstacles if it chooses
to do so.
First, it seems that the opportunity for revival of a
progressive, rights-expanding jurisprudence is real. California’s
ongoing partisan realignment should give Democrats control of
the Governor’s office for the foreseeable future, and Democratic
governors can be expected to create on the court a dominant
left-leaning majority. If so, it is possible that the California’s high
court will become substantially more progressive than the U.S.
Supreme Court in its thinking about rights—thus creating the
type of gaps between a state supreme court and the U.S.
Supreme Court that fuels the new judicial federalism.
Moreover, new theories of rights can be expected to emerge
in the near term, creating fresh opportunities for the court to
innovate by establishing new rights at the state level. While
some potential new rights may now seem implausible or remote,
others are knocking at the door.
California Supreme Court Justices, supra note 9.
See, e.g., Oren Kerr, The State Court Bench as SCOTUS Farm Team, WASH.
POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/23/the-state-court-bench-as-a-scotus-farm-team/ [http://per
ma.cc/R KX8-T49U].
220 See Gerald F. Uelmen & Kyle Graham, A Shifting Balance on the California
Supreme Court?: A Look at the State Supreme Court’s Newest Justices, CAL. LAW., Sept. 2015.
218
219
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One example is the asserted right to personal autonomy at
the end of life. In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Washington v. Glucksberg that the U.S. Constitution does not
protect a right to physician-assisted suicide, or physician
aid-in-dying.221 In recent years, a national movement has grown
to establish that right on a state-by-state basis. California law
long treated the aiding of suicide, by a physician or anyone else,
as a felony. After a long struggle, in 2015 proponents of “death
with dignity” persuaded the California Legislature to adopt, and
Governor Brown to sign, A.B. 15, a bill that liberalizes the
restrictions on physician aid-in-dying.222 The new law expands
the ability of certainly terminally ill adults to receive physician
assistance in terminating their lives, but includes various
qualifications and restrictions that limit access and choice. As the
movement for greater end-of-life autonomy gains force, advocates
may argue that these types of limitations burden constitutional
rights. In the same manner that the California Supreme Court
held that the Legislature’s early adoption of liberalized abortion
laws in the late 1960s failed to satisfy the constitutional
requirements, so, too, could a progressive court rule that the
state constitution demands greater personal autonomy for
persons at the end of life than the Legislature has endorsed.223
The issue of aid-in-dying has not yet reached the California
Supreme Court, but it may eventually present the court’s
progressive justices an opportunity to expand rights in this
contested area.
Advocates of other emerging claims in the areas of personal
autonomy and equality can be expected to set their sights on
California’s high court and encourage it to reassert its leadership
in the expansion of the frontiers of rights.
Such opportunities are matched by limiting factors. First is
the legacy of the court-constraining amendments California
voters enacted in response to Wright and Bird court decisions.
While the new court may creatively expand state constitutional
rights in some areas, in others, especially criminal law, it is

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
A.B. 15, 2015–2016 Leg. Sess., Spec. Sess. (Cal. 2015). For many years, California
Penal Code section 401 read: “Every person who deliberately aids, or advises, or
encourages another to commit suicide, is guilty of a felony.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West
2015). In 1992, proponents of physician-assisted suicide qualified Proposition 161, known
as the “Aid-in-Dying Act” for the California statewide ballot. The measure failed on a vote
of 46% yes to 54% no. California Proposition 161, the Aid-in-Dying Act (1992),
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_161,_the_Aid-in-Dying_Act_
(1992) [http://perma.cc/5NVE-MS4B]. Attempts to pass a similar law through the
Legislature also failed until 2015.
223 See People v. Barksdale, 503 P.2d 257, 276 (Cal. 1972).
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constrained by the restrictions the people placed in the state
constitution decades ago. A second potential limiting factor is the
Legislature. Today, the California Legislature is one of the most
progressive lawmaking bodies in the nation and is less likely
than its predecessors to take a back seat to the court in pursuing
a progressive vision of equality and personal autonomy. As the
aid-in-dying bill shows, rights activists can choose to go to the
Legislature to achieve their aims, and an ambitious court might
find itself competing with the political branches for leadership in
the expansion of rights. A third potential limiting factor is the
U.S. Supreme Court. The new judicial federalism has flourished
where state supreme courts are more progressive than the U.S.
Supreme Court and have expanded rights beyond where the U.S.
Supreme Court is willing to go. If new progressive justices cause
the U.S. Supreme Court to begin aggressively expanding federal
constitutional rights, that Court will dominate the field and
create fewer opportunities for the California Supreme Court, or
other state supreme courts, to assert leadership.
Finally, it is uncertain how the California electorate would
respond to a revival of the new judicial federalism. During the
Wright-Bird era, the electorate accepted some of the court’s
rights-expanding decisions, but overwhelmingly repudiated the
court’s jurisprudence in the areas of criminal law and mandatory
desegregation. The electorate of the 1970s and 1980s was
considerably more conservative than the court on these issues,
and that chasm between their respective values led the public to
adopt court-constraining amendments and, eventually, to remove
three progressive justices. Today, the California electorate is
more liberal than it was then and thus, in theory, should be more
inclined to embrace new rights-expanding decisions in a range of
areas. How the public would actually respond remains to be
tested.
CONCLUSION
The new judicial federalism flourished in California
during the 1970s and 1980s as the state supreme court became
the national leader in expanding state constitutional rights
beyond federal minimums. Many of those rights remain in place
today. Yet, in its enthusiasm to align California’s constitutional
law with the values of modern liberalism, the court distanced
itself too far from the public’s deeply held convictions in certain
areas, including busing, capital punishment, and criminal
procedure. In those cases, the court’s pursuit of a highly
counter-majoritarian progressive agenda was unsustainable—it
resulted in the wholesale reversal of decisions through state
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constitutional amendments, the removal of most of the court’s
progressive members, and their replacement with a new
conservative majority.
Since the crisis of the 1986 election, the California Supreme
Court has been more cautious in its approach to the new judicial
federalism. While in the post-Bird era the court defended the
concept of independent state constitutionalism, it showed
restraint in exercising that power. This self-restraint helped
produce a period of stability on the court, with few attempted
court-constraining amendments and no serious challenges to the
justices in retention elections.
The state has now entered an era in which Democratic
governors can be expected to nominate progressive justices for
the foreseeable future. As a new progressive majority emerges, it
has the opportunity to revive the court’s leadership in
establishing new rights. The prospect undoubtedly has appeal.
State supreme courts receive respect and affirmation from the
community of progressive legal academics and practitioners by
expanding the frontier of rights through expansive
interpretations of state constitutions. Moreover, as social change
creates new conceptions of rights, the court will have many
invitations to innovate.
If it seeks to expand rights, however, the new court will face
some limitations, including potential opposition from the
contemporary electorate. As the experience of the past several
decades demonstrates, the California Constitution gives the
people, not the court, the last word on the definition of contested
state constitutional rights. While this majoritarian check may
limit the new court’s ability to expand rights, it will also provide
greater legitimacy to any new state constitutional rights the
court establishes and the people accept. The California
electorate’s increasingly progressive orientation means that it is
now more likely to embrace rights-expanding decisions, at least
on some issues, than voters were a generation ago. But when
contemplating their future course, the new justices cannot forget
the fate of the Bird court, which will always serve as a cautionary
reminder that the California Constitution’s majoritarian features
limit how far an ambitious court can veer from the popular will.
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